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Direct Regulation of Hedge Funds: An Analysis of
Hedge Fund Regulation After the Implementation of
Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act
By: Jacob Johnson*
I. INTRODUCTION
Title IV of Dodd-Frank was enacted in response to the global financial
crisis of 2008 and the political pressure to be proactive and to prevent
another financial crisis that followed.1 However, this note argues that this
increase in hedge fund regulation is, in part, unnecessary. Overall, this
note will focus on the changes made to the Investment Advisers Act of
1940 (“Advisers Act”) by the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”)
and the benefits of an indirect regulatory strategy.

II. HEDGE FUND OVERVIEW
A hedge fund is a private investment pool that is managed by a
professional investment firm (also referred to as a “hedge fund manager”
or “investment advisor”).2 The ultimate goal of a hedge fund is to provide
returns to investors that do not necessarily mirror the returns of traditional
stock or bond markets. Hedge funds differ from mutual funds because
hedge funds do not seek “relative” returns, meaning hedge funds do not
measure their success by comparison to a benchmark such as the S&P 500
stock index.3 Rather, hedge funds seek “absolute returns,” which means
they aim to make positive returns regardless of how a certain benchmark
is performing by employing a variety of sophisticated trading strategies in
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1
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub.
L. No. 111-203, §§ 401-416, 124 Stat. 1376, 1571 (2010) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 80b-3, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2).
2
Hedge Fund, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hedgefund.asp
(last visited Mar. 25, 2018).
3
Hedge Funds and Dodd-Frank Reform, MANAGED FUNDS ASS’N.,
https://www.managedfunds.org/hedgefund-investors/hedge-fund-advisor/. (Feb. 28, 2018).
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securities, currencies and derivatives, amongst others.4 Additionally,
hedge funds are limited to high net worth investors and institutional
investors. Therefore, the idea is that the increased regulation of hedge
funds is not completely necessary because the sophisticated investors (i.e.,
institutional investors such as insurance companies, pension funds, banks,
and other investment funds) do not need the same level of protection as an
ordinary retail investor who may not understand the risks associated with
hedge funds.
Throughout the course of this comment the following topics will be
discussed in order to explain why the changes imposed by Title IV are
unnecessary: (1) risks associated with hedge funds; (2) the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940; (3) the failure of Long Term Capital Management
and the implications of this failure; (4) an overview of the changes made
after Title IV was enacted; (5) the impact of the Private Fund Investment
Advisors Registration Act of 2010 (“PFIARA”) on examinations of
registered investment advisers; (6) the problems with the current U.S.
regulatory scheme; and (7) a possible solution of introducing indirect
regulation.
Finally, this note argues that the indirect regulation of hedge funds is
superior to the direct regulation of hedge funds exacerbated by Title IV of
the Dodd-Frank Act. Mainly, direct regulation of hedge funds has proven
to be failure in terms of curbing systemic risk, as can be seen by Long
Term Capital Management. The indirect regulation of hedge funds places
the regulatory focus on the counterparties of hedge funds in order to
achieve the primary goal of regulating hedge funds. Indirect regulation of
hedge funds will limit systemic risk because counterparties of hedge funds
will be more careful and informed before entering into transactions with
hedge funds.

III. RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH HEDGE FUNDS
One of the key risks associated with hedge funds are their speculative
trading techniques, which use leverage (borrowed capital or equity for an
investment) hoping that the profits made will be greater than the interest
paid on the borrowed capital. In general, the use of leverage by a hedge
fund is when the hedge fund uses both the investors’ capital and the
borrowed capital to make investments, which will either greatly increase
4

Wulf Kaal & Dale Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United
States, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Feb. 29, 2016),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/02/29/the-history-of-hedge-fundregulation-in-the-united-states/.
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the potential gain, or greatly increase the potential loss from an
investment.5 Also, unlike mutual funds, hedge funds are allowed to take
short positions or sell short. For example, this requires that the hedge fund
borrow stock, and if the stock price declines before the hedge funds needs
to give back the borrowed stock, the hedge fund makes a profit.6 However,
if the stock price increases the hedge fund must still replace the stock it
borrowed and the losses are theoretically unlimited putting the investors at
risk. This is a basic example of a speculative trading technique used by
hedge funds cause a lot of concern regarding the hedge fund industry.
Further, one of the chief concerns regarding hedge funds is that they are
not sufficiently transparent.7 This concern stems from the fact that prior
to the passage of Title IV of Dodd-Frank, many hedge funds qualified to
be exempted from complying with the Advisers Act and therefore did not
have to disclose their investment strategies or their books and records
containing certain positions that some may be view as too risky.8 The antiregulation view held by many hedge funds is that without the ability to
keep their trading strategies confidential, hedge funds would not be able to
generate the massive returns that keep most them business.9 Also, there
are concerns over the level of risk-taking by hedge funds.10 Hedge funds
usually borrow from banks and when a hedge fund’s strategy fails the
losses are massive not only to the investors of a hedge fund but also for the
banks and other lenders.11 In 2004, as a result of the growth of the hedge
fund industry and the risks involved, the SEC determined that hedge fund
managers should register under the Advisers Act.12 To ensure hedge fund
managers registered their funds, the SEC adopted a rule requiring
investment advisers of hedge funds to “look-through” the fund and counts
as clients the fund’s investors for purposes of the fifteen-client threshold.13
5

Leverage, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/leverage.asp (last
visited Mar. 25, 2018).
6
Todd Zaun, Goldstein v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 1 J. BUS.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 111, 130 (2007),
http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jbel/vol1/iss1/6.
7
Kaal & Oesterle, supra note 4.
8
Id.
9
Zaun, supra, 111.
10
Id at 113.
11
Kaal & Oesterle, supra note 4.
12
William Sjostrom, Jr , Brief History of Hedge Fund Adviser Registration And its
Consequences for Private Equity and Venture Capital Advisers, 1 HARV. L. REV.,
39, 40 (Feb. 1, 2011) http://www.hblr.org/2011/02/a-brief-history-of-hedge-fundadviser-registration-and-its-consequences-for-private-equity-and-venture-capitaladvisers/.
13
Id.
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This development was significant because prior to this “look-through”
rule, only hedge funds managed by the advisor counted as “clients.” The
specifics of the “look-through” rule commonly referred to as the “hedge
fund rule” will be discussed in the section of this note titled, “Failure of
Long Term Capital Management and its Effect on Policy,” which explains
the event that initially led the SEC to implement the hedge fund rule.
A. General Reasons Why These Risks Should Not be Left Unregulated
Altogether
Some form of regulation is necessary to protect investors in the hedge
fund sector. Although hedge fund investors are typically sophisticated and
wealthy, they are still in need of protection. Even if an investor has
sufficient technical skills to properly assess and value the behavior of their
hedge fund manager it is still a nearly impossible task considering that no
hedge fund manager discloses the necessary information to investors,
which would allow them to monitor the fund’s activity.14 There are also
investment companies, referred to as “funds of hedge funds,” that focus on
investing in other hedge funds.15 Retail investors are able to buy shares of
these funds of hedge funds, which effectively allows retail investors to
indirectly invest in hedge funds.16 In this regard, some form of regulation
of hedge funds would indirectly benefit the retail investors who otherwise
would not be able to monitor and assess their investments.

IV. THE INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940
Under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”) many
hedge fund advisers did not have to register their funds with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) because of the private adviser
exemption.17 This exemption applied to an investment adviser who: (1)
had fewer than fifteen clients during the previous twelve months (small
adviser exemption), (2) did not publicly hold itself out as an investment
adviser, and (3) did not advise registered investment companies.18 An
“investment adviser” as defined by section 202(a)(11) of the Advisers Act
14

Marco Bodellini, From Systemic Risk to Financial Scandals: The Shortcomings of
U.S. Hedge Funds Regulation, 11 BROOK. J. CORP. & COM. L. 417, 447 (2017).
15
Matthew Lewis, A Transatlantic Dilemma: A Comparative Review of America
and British Hedge Fund Regulation, 22 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 347, 358 (2008).
16
Bodellini, supra note 14, at 448.
17
Sjostrom, supra note 12, at 39..
18
Id. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (54 Stat. 847, 15 U.S.C. 80b-1 - 80b-2)
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defines an investment advisor as any person or firm that: (1) for
compensation; (2) is engaged in the business of; (3) providing advice to
others or issuing reports or analyses regarding securities.19 The phrase “for
compensation” refers to the adviser receiving some sort of fee or
commission for his or her services.20 A person “engaged in the business”
simply means that the person is providing some sort of investment advice
regarding securities such as stocks, bonds, other funds, etc.21
Under the Advisers Act and prior to the passage of Title IV of DoddFrank, investment advisers, such as hedge fund managers, were able to
qualify for the private adviser exemption even though their fund had more
than fifteen investors because they only had to count as clients the funds
they advised and not the individual investors in the fund. 22 In other words,
hedge fund managers only counted entire hedge funds as clients as opposed
to counting the individuals who have invested money within the hedge
funds. This often allowed investment advisers to avoid registering with
the SEC, which in turn allowed them to avoid the various provisions of the
Advisers Act.23 Investment advisers were therefore able to avoid
provisions of the Advisers Act such as the requirement to disclose certain
information to clients, maintain business records, allow the SEC to
examine these books and records,24 and make certain periodic filings with
the SEC.

V. FAILURE OF LONG TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT AND ITS EFFECT
ON POLICY
One of the reasons the SEC wanted to increase hedge fund regulation
was because of the collapse of the hedge fund, Long Term Capital
Management, L.P. (“LTCM”) in 1998.25 LTCM had lost $4.4 billion of its
$4.7 billion in capital, which not only hurt the investors of the fund, but
exposed America’s largest investment banks to over $1 trillion in default
risks due to excessive leverage and risky trading strategies.26 LCTM used
19

15 U.S.C.S. § 80b-2(a)(11)
SEC v. Fife, 311 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002).
21
Id. at 3.
22
Sjostrom, supra note 12, at 39.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Todd Zaun, Goldstein v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 1 PEPPERDINE J.
BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 110, 118 (Nov. 11, 2007)..
26
Stephanie Yang, The Epic Story of How a ‘Genius’ Hedge Fund Almost Caused a
Global Financial Meltdown, BUS. INSIDER (Jul. 10, 2014, 4:26 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/the-fall-of-long-term-capital-management-201420
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massive amounts of leverage to pursue its investment goals.27 LTCM was
known to be extremely secretive regarding its operations and the general
partners withheld information about the strategies they were employing,
which frustrated the numerous banks the hedge fund was working with
because they were in the dark regarding how the capital they were lending
was being put to use.28
One of LTCM’s investment strategies was to hedge against a predictable
range of volatility in foreign currencies and bonds.29 Eventually, Russia
devalued its currency and defaulted on its bonds, a risk event that
registered outside of LTCM’s statistical models had estimated.30 Later, the
U.S. and European markets dropped significantly and investors across the
U.S. and Europe frantically sought security in Treasury bonds, which then
caused long-term interest rates to decrease by a full point.31 As a result,
LTCM took devastating losses and had ended up losing 50% of the value
of its capital invests. Eventually, the investment banks and other creditors
who had extended credit to LTCM realized that the fund might default,
which would likely result in negatively affecting the global financial
market.32 In order to avoid a global financial crisis, the Federal Reserve
and about fifteen other prominent banks bailed out LTCM by investing
$3.65 billion in exchange for 90% of the firm’s equity, which left existing
shareholder with a mere 10% holding.33
It was this example of the misuse of leverage by LTCM that led the SEC
to create new registration requirements for hedge funds. According to the
Advisers Act, the SEC had the ability change or remove rules and
requirements relating to the regulation of hedge funds.34 Therefore, on
October 26, 2004, the SEC voted to modify the small advisers exemption
portion of the Advisers Act.35 Under the new rule, “hedge fund managers
7?op=1/#riweather-set-up-his-own-hedge-fund-for-arbitrage-using-mathematicalmodels-to-predict-prices-stocked-with-industry-veterans-and-respected-academicsthe-firm-launched-in-1994-with-125-billion-in-capital-2.
27
Zaun, supra note 25 at 119.
28
Yang, supra note 26.
29
Kimberly Amadeo, What was the Long-Term Capital Management Hedge Fund
Crisis?, THE BALANCE (Aug. 12, 2017), https://www.thebalance.com/long-termcapital-crisis-3306240.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Justin Asbury Dillmore, Leap Before You Look: The SEC’s Approach to Hedge
Fund Regulation, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 169, 171 (2006).
33
Id.
34
Zaun, supra note 25 at 116
35
Justin Asbury Dillmore, Leap Before You Look: The SEC’s Approach to Hedge
Fund Regulation, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 169, 180 (2006).
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that operate ‘private funds’36 will be required to count each shareholder,
limited partner, member, other security holder or beneficiary of a private
fund as a client.”37 Previously, the private adviser exemption allowed
hedge fund managers to avoid registering with the SEC if they had fewer
than fifteen funds as clients because individual investors did not count as
“clients.” Therefore, under this new requirement, all of the investors or
shareholders of a private fund were each to be counted as separate clients
of the hedge fund manager in counting towards the fifteen-client maximum
stated within the small advisers exemption.38
A. Hedge Fund Rule Determined to be Invalid
The increased regulation proved very controversial because its
definition of “client” was arguably at odds with the Congressional intent
of the Advisers Act.39 The term “client” is commonly meant to describe
an individual or entity that receives direct advice from an investment
adviser rather than inactive investors who simply invest in the hedge fund
hoping the fund realizes a profit.40 The important distinction is that most
individual investors are simply contributing capital to hedge funds hoping
to realize a profit and are not receiving investment advice. On the contrary,
the client, which is a hedge fund in this case, is an entity receiving
investment advice from the hedge fund manager. Individual investors are
likely investing in the funds based on the fund managers’ expertise and on
the reputation of the fund itself. Moreover, the longstanding judicial
interpretation the definition of “client” has been a person or entity that
receives particularized advice.41 However, the SEC implemented the
hedge fund rule regardless of previous judicial interpretation of the term

36

Rule 203(b)(3)-2(d)(1) states that a “private fund” is defined to mean a company:
(1) that would be an investment company under Section 3(a) of the Investment
Company Act of 1940; (2) that permits investors to redeem any portion of their
ownership interest within two years of the purchase of their interests; and (3) that
offers interests in the private fund based on the investment advisory skills, ability or
expertise of the investment adviser. Investment Company Act of 1940 (54 Stat. 789,
15 U.S.C. 80b-3(b)(3)).
37
SEC Commissioners Approve Proposed Rules to Require Certain Hedge Fund
Managers to Register with the SEC, BULLET POINT, Oct. 27, 2004,
http://www.tanhelp.com/newsworthy/index/html.
38
Zaun, supra note 25 at 114.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 191 (1985).
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client because it felt that the widespread misuse of leverage and
speculation were issues large enough to warrant a change.42
Although the SEC was attempting to protect investors, its method for
doing so was inconsistent with Congress’ intentions.43 In June 2006, a
federal court of appeals held, in Goldstein v. SEC,44 that the look through
rule exceeded the SEC’s authority and was invalid. In Goldstein, Phillip
Goldstein, a shareholder activist mainly participating in proxy battles, was
the President of Kimball & Winthrop, Inc., the general partner of
Opportunity Partners L.P.45 Goldstein operated a $40 million hedge fund
from the basement of his home and he petitioned review of an order of the
SEC regulating hedge funds under the Advisers Act via the look through
provision and the hedge fund rule.46 Goldstein had two main theories that
were meant to invalidate the hedge fund rule.47 First, he argued that the
hedge fund rule violates Congressional intent by regulating private
investment entities and advisers, which Congress has expressly exempted
from regulation under the Advisers Act.48 Goldstein was arguing that the
SEC overreached by attempting to rewrite the statute and create new law
as opposed to simply modifying the rule. Next, Goldstein focused on the
definition of “client” as used in the Advisers Act and argues that its
definition is clear as interpreted by Congress and therefore, requires no
further interpretation by the SEC.49 Specifically, Goldstein is alleging that
the hedge fund rule goes beyond its authority by changing the term “client”
to include the individual investors, or shareholders, who have invested in
the fund.50 Instead, Goldstein claims that Advisers Act intended the term
“client” to refer to the partnership or fund-entity itself. Even the SEC had
previously interpreted “client” as referring to the hedge fund itself and so
most hedge fund managers were exempt because almost all hedge fund
managers managed fewer than fifteen funds.51
The SEC did not address Goldstein’s arguments but rather emphasized
that hedge funds needed to be regulated.52 The SEC focused on the growth
of hedge funds and the potential impact funds can have on the financial
42

Id.
Id.
44
Goldstein v. S.E.C., 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
45
Id. at 874.
46
Id.
47
Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 874.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 876.
52
Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 877.
43
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markets on a larger scale and how this was putting individual investors at
risk.53 Also, the SEC argued that hedge fund managers were actively
involved in recent scandals (i.e., the LTCM failure) and retail investors
were harmed by the far-reaching effects of the recklessness of these hedge
funds.54 Finally, the SEC argued that registration decreases the likelihood
of illegal activity and investor abuse because by requiring hedge fund
managers to register with the SEC, the SEC is ensuring that managers with
a history of committing fraud will be dealt with immediately.55
The D.C. Circuit Court held that the hedge fund rule was arbitrary and
capricious on its face and invalidated the SEC’s attempt to regulate hedge
funds by requiring registration.56 The court sided with Goldstein by
agreeing that even though the term “client” is not defined in the Advisers
Act, the SEC has no right to imply its own definition simply by reasoning
that it is ambiguous.57 The court explained its position by pointing to a
1970 amendment which in the court’s opinion, represents congressional
understanding that investment company entities (such as a hedge fund),
not the shareholders (individual investors), were the hedge fund manager’s
clients.58 Moreover, the court said that an individual investor in a private
hedge fund may benefit or suffer directly from the hedge fund manager’s
advice but the key difference is that the individual investor of a hedge fund
does not receive that advice directly like that of a general retail59
investment relationship.60
In sum, the court’s decision was based on the idea that retail investors
are not walking into the hedge fund’s office and receiving specific
investment advice from an investment representative of the fund.61 For
example, the hedge fund manager is not telling the investor how to spend
his or her money because the investor made his or her own decision,
without advice, to invest in the hedge fund.62 The court further stressed
53

Id.
Id.
55
Id. at 876.
56
Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 882.
57
Id. at 878. (The court explained that just because there is no definition in the
statute explicitly defining “client,” that does not automatically render the meaning of
“client” as being ambiguous).
58
Id.
59
A “retail investor” is a person who invests for their personal portfolio rather than
for an organization or company. See Retail Investor, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/retailivnestor.asp, (Feb. 28, 2018).
60
Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 879.
61
Zaun, supra note 25 at 127.
62
Id. at 129.
54
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this point by citing to the Supreme Court in Lowe v. SEC, which held that
those engaged in the investment advisory industry will “provide
personalized advice to a client’s concerns,” marking a conception of
fiduciary relationship.63 The Supreme Court in Lowe added that a direct,
fiduciary relationship exists only between the adviser and the hedge fund,
but not between the adviser and the investors in the fund.64 The key
takeaway from the decision in Lowe is that “personalized advice to a
client’s concerns” creates the fiduciary relationship and without an
investment advisor providing personalized advice to an individual
investor, the Adviser Act will not count the investor as a “client” of the
fund.

VI. OVERVIEW OF THE CHANGES MADE AFTER THE ENACTMENT OF
TITLE IV OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT
Included within Dodd-Frank is the Private Fund Investment Advisors
Registration Act of 2010 (“PFIARA”), which changes the registration
requirements of hedge fund advisers by requiring certain unregistered
investment advisers to register with the SEC under the Advisers Act.65
Most importantly, PFIARA removed the private adviser exemption
contained in the Advisers Act, which exempted advisers of private funds
from mandatory registration who: “(1) had less than 15 clients during the
preceding 12 months, (2) do not hold themselves out to the public as
investment advisers, and (3) do not advise registered funds subject to the
Investment Company Act of 1940.”66 PFIARA also made changes
impacting the reporting, disclosure, and record keeping requirements of
investment advisers in order to provide the SEC with information
necessary to evaluate systemic risk.67
PFIARA removed the private adviser exemption from the Advisers Act,
which means that hedge funds would likely have been better off had the
SEC won in Goldstein because if the SEC had won, Congress might not
have made changes to hedge fund registration requirements and left the
63

Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 880 (quoting Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 191 (1985)).
Id.(quoting Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. at 208).
65
Dodd-Frank Act, § 401.
66
The Effect of Dodd-Frank on Hedge Fund Managers, INVESTMENT LAW GROUP
(Aug. 18, 2010), http://www.investmentlawgroup.com/the-effect-of-dodd-frank-onhedge-fund-managers/.
67
Dodd-Frank: Title IV - Regulation of Advisers to Hedge Funds and Others,
CORNELL LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE (last visited Feb. 28, 2018)
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/dodd-frank_title_IV#.
64
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hedge fund rule in place.68 Hedge funds would have been better off
because Title IV of Dodd-Frank (PFIARA) effectively overruled the
Supreme Court’s decision in Goldstein, which resulted in more stringent
regulations regarding hedge fund manager registration than the original
hedge fund rule was.69. Section 408 of Dodd-Frank updates the Advisers
Act and provides that “The Commission shall provide an exemption from
the registration requirements under this section to any investment adviser
of private funds, if each of such investment adviser acts solely as an adviser
to private funds and has assets under management in the United States of
less than $150,000,000.”70 Regarding private funds that do in fact satisfy
the requirements of the new exemption, the Act provides that the SEC
requires these investment advisers to maintain records and provide the
SEC with annual or other reports, as the SEC determines necessary.71
Under the adviser registration form, advisers to private funds (i.e., hedge
fund managers) will have to provide basic organizational information
about the fund, such as the size, ownership, and advisor’s services to the
fund.72 In addition, the SEC strives to improve its regulatory program by
requiring all registered advisers to provide information about their
advisory business such as the types of clients they advise, their employees,
and their advisory activities.73 Most importantly, the Act specifically
requires the collection of information regarding the amount and types of
assets under management, leverage, counterparty credit risk, trading and
investment positions, valuation, side arrangements with investors, trading
practices, and other information necessary for the protection of investors.74
This information, in theory, will be used in order to prevent another
LTCM-type failure resulting in risk of a global financial crisis. However,
68

Sjostrom, supra note 12, at 40. See also Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 873 (The lookthrough approach would not have deleted the private adviser exemption (small
advisers exemption) altogether, but rather require that individual investors be
considered as “clients” when determining the fifteen client rule).
69
Kenneth Muller & Seth Chertok, The Impact of Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act on
Investment Advisers, BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS (2011)
https://media2.mofo.com/documents/110124-title-iv-bloomberg.pdf.
70
Dodd-Frank Act, § 408.
71
Id.
72
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC Adopts Dodd-Frank Act Amendments to
Investment Advisers Act, (June 22, 2011)
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-133.htm.
73
Id.
74
J.W. Verret, Revisiting Title IV: Why Mandatory SEC Registration for HedgeFund Advisers Is Not Necessary, GEO. MASON U.: MERCATUS CTR 93-103 (Apr.
2016), https://www.mercatus.org/publication/revisiting-title-iv-why-mandatory-secregistration-hedge-fund-advisers-not-necessary.
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the problem with this is that the SEC does not have the resources or level
of expertise necessary to organize, dissect, and understand this massive
amount of information.
A. Obligations of Investment Advisers Registered with the SEC
This increased registration requirement now means that most hedge
funds must register with the SEC, which is not the appropriate response
because there are alternative regulatory approaches that would more
effectively help solve any problems stemming from hedge funds. The
obligations that flow from the passage of the Act are mostly burdensome
and ineffective. Each of requirements associated with registration is
discussed below.
In order to comply with the Advisers Act, registered advisers need to
submit Form ADV. This form asks for basic information about the adviser,
a history of the adviser, and requires an explanation of the hedge fund’s
structure.75 The adviser must also implement a compliance program that
contains written policies and procedures designed to prevent violation of
the federal securities laws.76 The compliance program is expected to detect
potential risks and prevent violation of federal securities. Additionally,
SEC filing requirements maintain that registered advisers must meet
certain requirements in order to charge their clients a performance fee.77
Registered advisers may not charge performance fees for the profit
generated by the hedge fund unless the particular investor is a “qualified
client.”78 A “qualified client” is one who has a net worth of $1.5 million
dollars or places $750,000 under the advisor’s control.79 In theory, a
qualified client is a sophisticated investor and understands the risks of
investing money in a hedge fund.

VII. DODD-FRANK ACT’S IMPACT ON REGISTERED INVESTMENT
ADVISERS
Section 914 of Title IX of the Dodd-Frank Act mandated that the SEC
conduct a thorough study aimed at understanding the need for enhanced
examination and enforcement resources for investment advisers (the

75

17 C.F.R. § 275.203-1 (2005).
17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-7.
77
17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3 (2004)
78
Id.
79
Id.
76
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“Study”).80 Section III of the Study examines the impact of Dodd-Frank
on the SEC’s examinations of registered investment advisers, which are
performed by the Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations
(“OCIE”). This sub-section will describe the OCIE’s role and duties
regarding the SEC’s investment adviser examination program. The next
section will discuss the number and frequency of examinations of
registered investment advisers performed by OCIE staff between October
1, 2004 and September 30, 2010. The final section will discuss the impact
of the Dodd-Frank Act on examinations of registered advisers as explained
in the SEC’s “Study on Enhancing Investment Adviser Examinations.”81
A. OCIE’s Role and Duties Regarding the SEC’s Investment Advisor
Examination Program
The SEC, through OCIE staff is charged with examining registered
investment advisers’ books, records and activities with the goal of
improving compliance, preventing fraud, monitoring risk, and informing
regulatory policy.82 OCIE conducts examinations of high-risk investment
advisers, examinations based on tips or complaints, and examinations
referred to as “special purpose reviews,” which are risk-targeted sweeps
covering a wide range of regulated entities and limited in scope on specific
areas of concern within the financial services industry.83 These
examinations of registered investment advisers focus on detecting
violations of federal securities laws as well as ensuring that advisers have
proper compliance controls in place.84 OCIE also examines exchanges,
clearing agencies, and investment advisers that are affiliated with a brokerdealer.85 OCIE conducts its on-site examinations with teams of
“specialized staff,” but the Study does not go into further detail regarding
the OCIE personnel.86 A limited examination is said to take a few days,
while a more comprehensive examination might take several weeks or
months to complete.87 The Study adds that comprehensive examinations
of larger advisers with more complex operations as well as examinations
80
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of higher-risk advisers often take longer and require more staffing.88
Interestingly, the “comprehensive examinations” that take longer and
require staff with “special expertise” are described in the Study as mutual
fund complexes and hedge funds pursuing complex investment
strategies.89 It does not seem plausible that OCIE has the necessary
manpower and staff with the requisite “special expertise” to effectively
examine and monitor the vast amounts of registered mutual funds and
hedge funds. OCIE’s only response regarding how it will examine
complex operations is by stating that it will take longer and require specific
staff members for areas requiring special expertise.
B. Examination of Registration Investment Advisers Between October
1, 2004 and September 30, 2010
The Study explains that the number and frequency of examinations of
registered investment advisers is a function of the number of registered
investment advisers and the number of OCIE staff.90 During the six-year
period between October 1, 2004 and September 30, 2010 the number of
registered investment advisers increased and the number of OCIE staff
dedicated to examining registered advisers decreased, which resulted in a
decrease in the frequency of examinations.91 The Study reported that the
number of registered advisers increased 38.5%, from 8,581 advisers to
11,888 advisers and the assets managed by the registered advisers grew
58.9%, from $24.1 trillion to $38.3 trillion.92 Accordingly, not only did
the number of registered advisers increase and the number of OCIE staff
dedicated to examining registered advisers decrease, but also the advisers’
assets under management increased by 9.1%. Further, over the six-year
period the number of OCIE staff decreased 3.6%, from 477 staff to 460
staff and the Study adds that staff even fell as low as 425 staff between
September 30, 2007 and September 30, 2008.93
Following from the above statistics, the Study reported that the number
of examinations decreased 29.8%, from 1,543 examinations in 2004 to
1,083 examinations in 2010.94 This decrease in examinations performed
by OCIE can be attributed to the increase in the number of registered
88
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advisers, the decrease in OCIE staff, and the fact that OCIE devotes most
of its resources to examinations of higher-risk advisers, which takes more
time.95 These statistics indicate that the SEC and OCIE do not have the
resources necessary to achieve their goal of improving compliance and
monitoring risk. Furthermore, the Study does not discuss anything
regarding the adequacy of the examinations or whether or not the
examinations are performed correctly and diligently by staff members who
are able to understand the information they are gathering.
C. Impact of the Act on Examination of Registered Investment Advisers
The Study predicted that the number of SEC-registered advisers would
grow from 8,358 advisers to 10,897 advisers in five years, and the amount
of assets they manage would grow from $38.5 trillion to $49.5 trillion.96
Later, in 2016 the OCIE reported in its “Examination Priorities For 2017”
letter, that the OCIE oversees more than 12,000 investment advisers with
nearly $67 trillion in assets under management.97 Also, in 2016 OCIE
shifted 100 broker-dealer staff examiners to the Investment Adviser
Examination program, which increased the total number of OCIE staff
dedicated to examining only investment advisers to over 600 people.98
However, simply increasing the number of staff members focusing on
investment advisers is not enough. OCIE needs investigators who
understand the inner workings of private funds and how they operate.
Overall, the lack of resources and specialization by the OCIE raises
concern regarding the effectiveness of these examinations in monitoring
risk.
The SEC’s plan to increase investment adviser registration and its
examination of these investment advisers through the OCIE is an
ineffective regulatory approach and will ultimately be more harmful than
helpful. Hedge funds employ complex strategies in order to achieve
absolute returns in all market environments and it is unlikely that the OCIE
has the resources or expertise to comprehend these strategies disclosed by
registered hedge funds. The OCIE lacks the resources and expertise to
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properly monitor investment advisers and the complex investment
strategies the advisers’ hedge funds employ. Former Federal Reserve
Chairman, Alan Greenspan articulated this problem by stating, “[b]y the
time of detection, hedge funds would have long since moved on to different
strategies.”99
This level of mandatory disclosure required of all registered investment
advisers has harmful effects on the financial system. Hedge funds are
inherently secretive regarding their positions and strategies because they
do not want competitors stealing their long-term trading strategies, which
would hinder their competitive advantage. This goal to maintain secrecy
is in conflict with the disclosure requirements. This level of disclosure is
unnecessary compared to other aspects of the financial system where
disclosure does not negate the purpose of the industry’s existence.
The entire financial system benefits from the hedge fund industry for
numerous reasons. First, hedge funds are one of the main sources of
creating liquidity in the market, which makes markets more efficient due
to large capital injections.100 This increased liquidity in the markets leads
to more financial options for investors and allows for new ways to hedge
investments, which reduce overall risk.101 Second, hedge funds add value
to the markets because of their potential influence over companies, which
is necessary to invoke changes in management necessary to generate
value.102 A number of hedge funds become activist shareholders acquiring
a minority equity position in a corporation.103 Activist shareholders, such
as hedge funds, advocate for changes within the corporation such as
reducing costs, increasing leverage, or divesting certain businesses.104
Finally, hedge funds contribute to global stability during a financial crisis
by acting as a counterparty to systemically important financial systems.105
Hedge funds assume risks that would otherwise have a negative impact on
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the global financial system if not transferred from these large institutions’
balance sheets.106

VIII. PROBLEM WITH THE CURRENT U.S. REGULATORY SCHEME
The problem with the current hedge fund regulatory system set forth by
PFIARA is that it does not prevent the spread of system risk or protect
investors from illegal activity by hedge fund managers. The relevant new
rules introduced by PFIARA are the mandatory registration with the SEC
of hedge fund managers with over $150 million of assets under
management107 and the duty to disclose certain investment information to
both the SEC and investors. The goals of PFIARA are to further investor
protection and reduce systemic risks created and accelerated by hedge fund
activity.
In order to promote investor protection, PFIARA requires that hedge
fund advisers must now file Form ADV with the SEC.108 Form ADV is the
official registration form an investment adviser must file with the SEC.
The goal of Form ADV is to protect investors by creating risk profiles of
investment advisers.109 PFIARA aims to satisfy its goal of better assessing
systemic risk posed by hedge funds by requiring hedge funds to submit a
Form PF to the SEC.110 Form PF contains data on each fund managed by
a hedge fund manager and requires that the manager include his or her
investment strategies, the percentage of the fund’s assets managed using
high-frequency trading strategies, each fund’s gross and net assets, the
value of its derivative positions, and its use of leverage amongst other
things.111 The SEC does not have the expertise nor the resources to
properly analyze this information and ultimately fails to reduce systemic
risk posed by the hedge fund industry.
However, the goals of PFIARA can be met without mandatory
registration and thus, the SEC is not using its resources efficiently. Hedge
funds and their excessive use of leverage are often the main cause of
systemic risk. Requiring mandatory registration with the SEC results in
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an increase of disclosed information regarding hedge fund activity. The
SEC still needs to bridge the gap between this new information by
enforcing some standard relating to leverage. Not only is there a
disconnect between the influx of information regarding hedge fund activity
and effective enforcement by the SEC, the information the SEC is
receiving may not be accurate. The SEC has stated that the data collected
in Form PF is not consistent between investment advisers and could be
misleading.112 The inconsistency arises because investment advisers take
different approaches and assumptions made when disclosing the
information required by the Form PF.113 Some of the complaints related to
Form PF have been that the questions are ambiguous and that there has
been little guidance by the SEC to clarify the manner in which the Form
PF should be completed.114 Ultimately, the problem with Form PF and the
SEC’s general information collecting ability is that there a lack of a
uniform approach in providing the required information. The SEC relies
on the investment advisers to value their fund’s assets and derivate
positions, which is difficult to do and requires some subjectivity.
Finally, the increased disclosure requirements limit the effectiveness of
hedge funds and therefore preclude the benefits hedge funds bring to
financial markets. Moreover, the increase in direct U.S. regulations
inhibiting the hedge funds’ freedom will lead to hedge funds eventually
moving abroad.115 If a mass exodus such as this occurs, investors will have
no protection under the U.S. federal securities laws.

IX. SOLUTION: INDIRECT REGULATION OF HEDGE FUNDS VIA SELFREGULATING PRIME BROKERS
Indirect regulation is based on the regulation of the creditors and
counterparties that provide financial services to hedge funds.116 In other
words, the indirect regulation of hedge funds is done through the direct
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regulation of other market participants such as creditors and counterparties
of hedge funds.
“Prime brokers” are the key counterparties to hedge funds and generally
belong to a division of large investment banks.117 Prime brokers offer
numerous services to hedge funds on a daily basis including: providing
credit to finance funds’ leverage positions, providing margin credit to
finance purchases of stock, borrowing stock from other hedge funds on
behalf of hedge fund clients to support short positions, and as
intermediaries in funds’ securities transactions.118 Prime brokers are in the
best position to evaluate the fund’s risk exposure because they are able to
determine the liquidity of the fund’s positions and the amount of leverage
currently being employed by the fund.119 Regulating these prime brokers
would ensure that they are properly monitoring a fund’s transactions and
amount of leverage. Otherwise, prime brokers are incentivized to ignore
certain risk markers and look the other way if a hedge fund is engaging in
risky behavior in order to maintain their prosperous business relationship
with the hedge fund.
A self-regulatory body of prime brokers would be able to implement an
agreed upon method of risk management in order to deter prime brokers
from offering favorable credit terms or offering low margin requirements
in order to attract more hedge fund business.120 Further, an organization
of prime brokers would be able to combine a particular hedge fund’s
market positions, considering most hedge funds use multiple prime
brokers.121 This also better addresses the PFIRA Act’s goal of preventing
systemic risk because it puts the responsibility of monitoring leverage on
the prime brokers who have the expertise and resources to do so. These
disclosures would help reduce systemic risk while also keeping hedge fund
trading information and investment strategies confidential.122 A selfregulating organization of prime brokers would have the necessary
information on a particular hedge fund’s market positions and amount of
leverage. This body would be able to identify problems before they
happen.123 If a self-regulatory organization of prime brokers consolidated
117
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a particular hedge fund’s market positions and information regarding its
use of leverage, any particular prime broker would have the necessary
information to identify certain risks and avoid or limit extending credit to
the fund.
In order for this proposition to succeed, the self-regulating organization
would need to be able to sanction and punish prime brokers who are not
conducting proper risk management practices. For example, a fine against
a prime broker would need to be large enough so it exceeds the short-term
benefit of a primer broker extending credit to an overleveraged hedge
fund.124 Otherwise, there would be no deterrent if the wrongful action was
still profitable.

X. CONCLUSION
The increased disclosure requirements set forth by PFIARA does not
increase investor protection or reduce systemic risk posed by hedge funds.
The use of excessive leverage by hedge funds is the main contributor to
system risk and any regulatory regime should be focused around
monitoring hedge funds’ use of leverage. PFIARA changed the
registration requirements of hedge fund advisers by mandating hedge
funds with over $150 million of assets under management to register with
the SEC under the Advisers Act. However, the SEC does not have the
expertise or available resources to analyze the disclosed information and
use that information to protect investors and reduce systemic risk. A
potentially better regulatory strategy would be to regulate hedge funds
indirectly by regulating the hedge funds’ prime brokers. The creation of a
self-regulating organization of prime brokers would help prevent systemic
risk by requiring prime brokers to monitor the leverage and overall risk
profiles of their hedge fund clients and refrain from extending credit if
need be.
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